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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines the role of Susu a traditional banking system in the development of Micro and 
Small Enterprises (MSEs) in Ghana, using some selected MSEs and Susu operators. It combines 
both a reflective and empirical analysis approach. It is based on extensive review of literature on 
the subject and draws its conclusions from analysis of field data.  It attempts to underscore the 
significance of Susu to MSEs in Ghana.  The paper sought to ascertain the role of Susu in the 
development of MSEs by examining the effects of Susu on MSE development. The assessment was 
based on analysis of total turnover on investments, and number of people employed after five 
years of involvement in any Susu scheme. It also reviews the strengths, weaknesses and challenges 
of the system and offers some suggestions for strengthening it.  The results of the study indicated 
that Susu generally contributes to the development of MSEs.  However, the Susu systems favour 
the development of unorganized MSEs than organized MSEs. MSEs that do not rely on heavy 
capital outlay are more likely to succeed with Susu than those with heavy capital outlay. The study 
identifies self regulation as the major set back of the Susu scheme and recommends a system of 
regulation that may replicate the Ghana Credit Unions Association (GCUA) system. 
 
Key Words:  Susu, Microfinance, MSEs, Development 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
icro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) are commonly believed to have very limited access to deposits, 
credit facilities and other financial support services provided by Formal Financial Institutions 
(FFIs). This is because on one hand, these MSEs cannot provide the necessary collateral security 
demanded by these formal institutions and on the other hand, the banks find it difficult to recover the high cost 
involved in dealing with small firms. In addition to this, the associated risks involved in lending to MSEs make it 
unattractive to the banks to deal with such small enterprises (World Bank, 1994). Statistically, small enterprises are 
reported to have high failure rates making it difficult for lenders to assess accurately the viability of small 
enterprises, the abilities of the entrepreneur, and the likelihood of repayment.  These are the most important criteria 
of creditworthiness applied by the banks (Ibid). Banks depend heavily on an entrepreneur's track record so when 
these are not available as in the case of MSEs, it becomes difficult to deal with such enterprises.  Consequently, 
MSEs generally suffer serious economic deprivation as they strive hard to satisfy their basic business and financial 
needs. Many successful small enterprises have been reported to have had at least some access to bank finance and 
other forms of external finance. Other sources of support such as customers' advances and supplier's credit have also 
been mentioned to be at least as important as bank credit to many SMEs. Recent research results also suggests that 
though the demand for finance by small enterprises is less than is usually suggested by firm-level surveys, the 
M 
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demand is however more than the actual threshold that  banks do accommodate.  This brings to the fore the 
importance of informal financing, particularly micro-financing to the development of MSEs (World Bank, 1994).  
 
In Ghana, only 5-6% of the population is reported to have access to formal banking facilities (Basu et al., 
2004). It has been reported that between 1998 to 1999, thirty nine percent (39%) of Ghanaians borrowed money but 
only 3% of these people used formal institutions.  (Claessens 2005).  The lack of formal banking and credit facilities 
underpins the development of MSEs to a very large extent. This has serious implications for a country like Ghana 
where the economy is largely characterized by Micro and Small Scale Enterprises (MSEs). Though it has been 
suggested that there seem to be no evidence that SMEs alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality it has also 
been established that there is a strong association between the importance of SMEs and GDP per capita (Beck Et al, 
2004). This suggests that MSEs development should be a matter of grave concern when considering issues of 
national development. 
 
The frustrations of accessing credit facilities from formal financial systems compel the informal enterprises 
to resort to different non banking and informal arrangements to access funds for their business operations. Informal 
financial institutions operating outside the scope of banking laws and regulations in Ghana include Moneylenders, 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA), and Savings Collectors.  Both ROSCA and Susu Collectors 
commonly assist market traders, house wives and artisans to accumulate funds through daily or weekly deposits that 
are returned at the end of a specified period minus a small fee (World Bank, 1994). These activities are both  based 
on the  “Susu” system.  
 
Susu is one of Africa‟s most ancient traditional banking systems which have over the years been the mode 
of fund mobilization for initiation, sustenance and in some cases development of MSEs, particularly micro 
enterprises. In Ghana, the word “Susu”  is believed by some indigenous people  to be Ga, a Ghanaian language, 
though some are of the view that it may be Akan another local Ghanaian Language. The system is reported to have 
originated from Yoruba, Nigeria where the „Gas‟, a Ghanaian southern tribe is believed to have migrated from. Susu 
is an informal financial identification for daily or weekly deposit collection on the West African markets.  “This 
Institution is ancient, dating back at least to the 16
th
 century, when Yoruba slaves carried it to the Caribbean, as 
part of their institutional luggage or social capital.  Both the term ‘Esusu; and the practice have persisted to this 
day, as Esu in the Bahamas, Susu in Tobago or Sou in Trinidad.  Among the Yoruba in Nigeria today, it has been 
noted that there is hardly a single adult who is not a member of  one or even several Esusu.  (Seibel 2001: 3).  The 
Institution exists all over West Africa as well as in many other parts of the world, where it is an integral part of the 
local micro-finance. With the expansion of the money economy, these informal financial institutions (IFIs) have not 
lost their vigor.  Quite to the contrary, they have multiplied, both in numbers and diversity (Barclays 2005).  The 
Susu system seems to have proven to be a dependable and cost effective mechanism of emphasizing state 
participation and encouragement of the domestic indigenous sector. 
 
Susu can be described as a form of banking because it is a system of trading in money which involves 
safeguarding deposits and making the funds available to the owners when required or to borrowers at a fee. Susu can 
be considered a true banking system because historically, the essence of banking is to satisfy credit needs in business 
as Susu seeks to do. However, Susu is more than a financial product. It is also a social capital. As a social capital,  
the individual members derived mutual benefits from the network that cannot be achieved by isolated member 
efforts (De Souza Briggs, 1997).  The Susu system has though, remained the purview of traditional groups and 
individuals for a long time and constitutes the crust of the informal microfinance system in Ghana. This system 
currently thrives on self regulation by operators. However, due to the perceived contributions of Susu to the 
development  of MSEs, and its ability to mop excess liquidity through its savings mobilization methods, Susu is now 
being recognized and incorporated into some formal financial institutions as a deposit - loan system using Susu 
collectors (Basu et al 2004, Barclays Ghana 2005). The question is, does Susu really support MSE development in 
Ghana?  
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The objective of this paper is to examine the role of Susu in the development of MSEs in Ghana using 
some selected MSEs, Susu Operators (SOs)
1
 and Formal Financial Institutions (FFIs). In doing this, the paper 
attempts to underscore the significance of Susu to the Micro and Small Enterprises in Ghana.  The paper seeks to 
ascertain the effects of Susu on MSE development by assessing Total Turnover On Investment (TTOI) and number 
of people employed after five years of involvement in any Susu system in Ghana.   It further seeks to ascertain the 
strengths, weakness and challenges of the system and   finally to offer some suggestions for strengthening the 
system.  
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
 ARB Association of Rural Banks 
 BOG Bank of Ghana 
 CBO Community-based organization 
 CUA Ghana Co-operative Credit Unions Association 
 CUs Credit Unions 
 ENOWID Enhancing Opportunities for Women in Development 
 FFH Freedom From Hunger 
 GHAMFIN Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network 
 GCSCA Ghana Co-operative Susu Collectors Association 
 IDA International Development Association 
 IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development 
 MFIs microfinance institutions 
 MSEs micro and small enterprises 
 NBFIs non-bank financial institutions 
 NBSSI National Board for Small-Scale Industries 
 NGOs non-governmental organizations 
 RBs Rural Banks 
 RCBs Rural and Community Banks 
 RFSP Rural Financial Services Project (AfDB, GTZ, IFAD, World Bank) 
 RMF rural micro finance 
 RMFI rural and micro finance institutions 
 S&L Savings and Loans Company 
 SMEs Small and Medium-scale Enterprises 
 UNDP United Nations Development Program 
 USAID United States Agency for International Development 
 WWBG Women‟s World Banking Ghana 
 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
 
The definition of MSEs in this study is founded on the classification of enterprises by the National Board 
for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI), The Ghana Enterprise Development Commission (GEDC), Ghana Statistical 
Survey, Industrial Statistics, and UNIDO‟s definition for developing countries. In this context, the definition for 
MSEs is based on the number of employees and Total Turnover on Investments (Kayanula and Quartey 2000, 
Elaian, K 1996, Steel and Webster 1990, Osei et al 1993). The definition takes into consideration some inherent 
weaknesses and arbitrariness in some of the definitions mentioned when they stand alone. By this classification, 
Micro-Enterprise employs less than 5 people with a total turnover of up to $10,000 equivalent, Small Enterprises 
employ 5-19 people with a total turn over of between $10,000 - $100,000 equivalent and Medium Enterprises 
                                                 
1 There are three categories of Susu Operators (SOs), these are: Susu Collectors (Individuals or Companies),  Rotating Savings 
and Credit Associations (ROSCA) and Susu Clubs 
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employ 20 to 100 people with an annual turn over of above $100,000.  Ekumah and Essel had also used a similar 
categorization in their 2003 IMF working paper. (Kayanula and Quartey 2000: 9, Ekumah and Essel 2003: 23).  
 
MSEs have further been classified into two categories, `organised‟ and `unorganised‟ enterprises. The 
organized MSEs  ‘are those with paid employees and a registered office  and Unorganized MSEs are mainly made 
up of artisans who work in open spaces, temporary wooden structures, or at home and employ little or in some cases 
no salaried workers. They rely mostly on family members or apprentices’.   (Kayanula  Quartey, 2000,  Liedholm & 
Mead, 1987; Osei et al, 1993, World Bank, 1992; Gray, Cooley & Lutabingwa, 1997) 
 
The operational definition for Total Turnover on Investment (TTOI) is the change between the present 
value of   total revenue an enterprise generates from its investments in assets and the total revenue at the time of 
joining any Susu scheme. 
 
TTOI     = T5 - T0 
     A5 – A0 
    
Where   T0 is the average sales at the point of joining any Susu Scheme 
  T5 is the average sales after five years joining any Susu Scheme 
  A0 is total investment at the point of joining any Susu Scheme 
  A5 is total investment after five years of joining any Susu Scheme 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology was based on a cross- sectional survey method with three (3) main components.  These 
included Reviews, Contacts and Field Activities. The review was conducted through desk research of online 
resources, research papers, working documents, conference documents, and other publications.  The contacts were 
made through one on one discussion and/or small group discussions by visiting offices and officials of banks 
involved in the Susu system whether, semi informal or formal. A self developed instrument was used for the field 
exercise. The study classified the Susu system into three categories based on the classification by Basu et al., 2004 
in an IMF working paper.  These are Susu Clubs and Susu Associations,
2
 Mobile Collectors
3
, and Cooperatives
4
. 
The sample design was based on a multi-phase sampling approach. The Ghana Cooperative Susu Collectors 
Association (GCSCA) was contacted for their membership list. A purposive sample of each category was drawn 
based on judgment sampling. The sample frame for the Susu Operators was made up of: 
 
 5 Susu Clubs and Associations 
 10 Mobile collectors 
 5 Susu cooperatives 
 
Lists of contributors (MSEs) that have contributed to Susu for at least five years were compiled from the 
selected Susu Operators. The lists were first stratified into organized and unorganized MSEs and then the systematic 
sampling technique used to draw the test sample from the list of contributors (MSEs). A follow-up was then made to 
interact with Contributors using the self developed questionnaire. Both the organized and unorganized MSEs were 
sampled from five communities in Accra, namely: East Legon, Kaneshie, Nungua, Madina and Abokobi 
representing urban affluent,  peri-urban, urban poor and rural settings. 
 
                                                 
2 Offer a savings vehicle by collecting daily amounts voluntarily saved by their clients, which they return at the end of the month 
minus one day‟s amount as commission. 
3 These are (a) Associations: either rotating savings and credits Associations (ROSCAs) that collect savings from their members 
and allocate them to each member in turn, or accumulating which allows regular contributions to the accumulated to act as a back 
up or insurance for special events like funerals, etc. (b) Clubs: this combines the first two concepts, operated by a single agent. 
Members commit to save a pre-defined amount over a medium term (50 to 100 week cycle) and pay commissions on each 
payment and fees when they are advanced the targeted amount before the end of the cycle. (Basu et al 2004:9) 
4 These are credit unions and cooperatives which have employed the Susu concept. 
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 Group 1: Organized SMEs 
SMEs with paid employees and a registered office  
 
 Group 2: Unorganized SMEs 
Mainly made up of artisans who work in open spaces, temporary wooden structures, or at home and employ 
little or in some cases no salaried workers. They rely mostly on family members or apprentices.  
 
STUDY TOOLS 
 
The survey tool was semi structured and included questions covering number of years of involvement in 
any Susu scheme, source of initial capital, total turnover on investments before and after joining any Susu scheme
5
, 
sources of the working capital, and number of employees before and after joining Susu for at least five years and 
whether Susu is the sole source of fund mobilization or savings. The tool also sought to ascertain how Susu has 
contributed to the growth of their business based on number of employees and Total Turnover on Investment. (Refer 
to  Appendix C) 
 
Assumptions Of The Study 
 
The study is based on the following Assumptions 
 
 That increases in number of employees reflects growth of an MSE 
 That increases in Total Turnover on Investment reflects  growth 
 That these parameters can be assesses quantitatively and accurately 
 
Analysis Of Data 
 
The paired observation test was used to analyze the data and to ascertain the relationship between 
involvement in any Susu scheme for at least five years and the development of MSEs in terms of changes in number 
of people employed and changes in total turnover on investment. 
 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
 
A total of 101 MSEs were interviewed. These included forty one (41) organized and 60 unorganized MSEs 
mainly traders, service providers, artisans and vocational business operators. In addition the Ghana Cooperative 
Susu Collectors Association (GCSCA) and four banks were visited to collect data.    
 
The biggest challenge encountered in gathering and analyzing the data for this study was the lack of 
adequate book keeping records and knowledge of financial accountability by MSEs. Ascertaining increase in 
number of employees was however more reliable than the total turnover. The study set out to measure the 
differences in annual turn over, but the difficulties encountered during pre-testing of the study tool resulted in 
modifying the study indicator to total turn over on investment.  
 
The results are categorized into three:  
 
 Sources of initial and working capital 
 Analysis of changes in number of employees and total turnover on investment 
 Interviews of MSEs and financial institution 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Total turnover on investment is the working capital at the time of the survey. 
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Sources Of Initial And Working Capital 
 
 
Table 1:  Sources of Initial and Working Capital by MSEs 
 
Sources Source of Initial Capital Source of  Working Capital 
Organized MSEs Unorganized MSEs Organized MSEs Unorganized MSEs 
Own Savings (Susu) 17 32 20 38 
Relations 16 23 7 3 
Bank Loan 4 0 3 6 
Suppliers Credit 3 2 11 17 
Profits na na 25 46 
Customer Advances 4 6 5 8 
Source: Study results 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
Changes In Number Of Employees And Total Turnover On Investment 
 
1. Analysis of composite Data (for both organized and unorganized MSMEs) 
 
H0 :   The change in number of employees and total turnover on investment after 5 years of Susu contribution is 
not significantly  different   
 
H1:  The changes in both the number of employees and total turnover on investment after five years of Susu is 
significantly different.  
 
 
Table 2:  Analysis of changes in number of employees and total turn over of MSMEs 
(Paired Observation Test) 
 
Study Variable Number of 
Respondents 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
Test 
Statistics 
critical 
values 
Changes in number 
of employees 
97 2.247 2.031168218 0.2062332 10.897481 2.33 
changes in total 
turnover 
101 3,972,489.505 12866078.15 1280334.2 3.1026974 2.33 
Source: Survey Results 
 
 
From the paired observation test, the test statistic for changes in number of employees is 10.897 which is 
greater than the critical 2.33 hence we fail to accept the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance and the test 
statistic of total turn over , 3.102 is greater than the critical 2.33.  Since the test statistics is greater than the critical 
we fail to accept the H0, which suggest that within the limits of all errors encountered there is enough evidence to 
suggest that the change in the total Turnover on Investment of MSEs is significant.  Therefore it can be suggested 
that there is a supportive relationship between the involvement of Susu and MSE development in Ghana. 
 
 
2. Analysis of Differentials 
 
 Organized MSMEs 
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Table 3:  Analysis of Changes in Number of Employees and Total Turnover of Organized MSEs  
(Paired Observation Test) 
 
Study Variable Number of 
Respondents 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
Test 
Statistics 
critical 
values 
Changes in number 
of employees 
32 1.688 1.654661061 0.2925032 5.7691687 2.33 
changes in total 
turnover 
36 1,223,301.389 5846297.564 974382.93 1.2554627 2.33 
Source: Survey Results 
 
 
From the paired observation test, the test statistic for changes in number of employees is 5.769 which is 
greater than the critical 2.33. Hence we fail to accept the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance. For total turn 
over on investment the test statistic, 1.255 is less than the critical 2.33. Since the test statistics is less than the critical 
we fail to reject the H0, which suggest that within the limits of all errors encountered there is enough evidence to 
suggest that the change in the total return on investment of organized MSEs is not statistically significant after five 
years of involvement in any Susu system. This could point to the fact that organized SMEs are likely to be 
employing more people than may be required. This together with other overhead cost may lead to higher operational 
cost resulting in the insignificant change in turnover over the period under consideration. 
 
 
3. Unorganized MSEs 
 
 
Table 3:  Analysis of Changes in Number of Employees and Total Turnover of  Unorganized MSEs 
(Paired Observation Test) 
 
Study Variable Number of 
Respondents 
Mean 
Difference 
Standard 
Deviation 
Standard 
Error 
Test 
Statistics 
critical 
values 
Changes in number 
of employees 
65 2.523 2.151363611 0.2668524 9.4549550 2.33 
changes in total 
turnover 
65 5,495,116.769 15275869.45 1894728.5 2.9002133 2.33 
Source: Survey Results 
 
 
From the paired observation test statistic, 9.455 is greater than the critical 2.33 therefore we fail to accept 
the H0, which suggest that within the limits of all errors encountered there is enough evidence to suggest that there is 
a significant difference in change in number of employees after five years of involvement in any Susu system. 
 
From the paired observation test statistic, 2.900 is greater than the critical 2.33, therefore we fail to accept 
the H0.  This suggest that within the limits of all errors encountered in the study,  there is enough evidence to suggest 
that there is a significant difference in total turn over on investment though to a lesser extent in comparism to the 
change in number of employees after at least five years of involvement in any Susu system. 
 
Discussion Of Results 
 
Analysis of the results of the study suggests that, most MSEs rely on Susu through personal savings and 
remittances from relations to start their businesses. About eighty – two percent (82%) of MSEs relied on both Susu 
and remittances from relations. This was made up of Susu 46% and relations support 36%. Customer advances 
constituted 9.34%, Suppliers‟ credit 4.7% while Bank loans constituted only 3.73% as source of initial capital. This 
makes Susu the single largest contributor as source of initial capital.  Susu and profit injection were the main sources 
of working capital constituting about 68.3% of working capital though here profits contributed a little more than 
Susu.  The Study brought to the fore that though Susu generally contributes to the development of Micro and Small 
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Scale Enterprises in Ghana, its role in creating income stability, employment and growth is statistically questionable 
for organized MSMEs. However it seems to remain an effective means of raising initial capital and for sustaining 
most MSEs through weekly contributions to ROSCA and Susu clubs with a few bank interventions.   
 
Generally, there was a significant change in the number of employees and total turnover on investment for 
MSEs involved in any Susu scheme for at least five years. However, the difference in turnover observed was 
accounted for largely by the unorganized MSEs. This is because while the changes in both the number of employees 
and total turnover on investment for the unorganized MSEs were statistically significant, it was not the same in the 
case of the organized MSEs. In the case of the organized MSEs, analysis of data revealed that though there was a 
significant change in the number of employees,  the corresponding change in total turnover on investment was not 
significant. This raises a number of questions. Could this factor contribute to the reasons why most SMEs  normally 
collapse after five years?  
 
The analysis of data supports the view that even though the MSEs sector is labour intensive and employs 
more people per unit of capital than larger enterprises, the job creating impact can be said to be a statistical flaw. 
The results of this study suggest that increases in employment created by MSEs may not often be associated by 
increases in productivity particularly for organized MSEs. This was made evident by the analysis of data,  which 
clearly indicated that though increases in number of employees of organized MSEs involved in any Susu system for 
at least five years were statistically significant, the total turnover of the organized MSEs over the same period  were 
not significant. This implies that the increases in productivity were not significant whereas, the number of 
employees were. The results therefore, pointed to the fact that organized MSEs may actually be employing more 
than they actually require or in addition may not be making efficient use of scarce resources as is sometimes 
believed. 
 
In addition, though changes in both employees and total turn over on investment were significant for 
unorganized MSEs, in reality the job creating effects of MSEs in general can be said to be virtually less significant. 
This is because unorganized MSEs rely on unpaid services from either family relations or apprentices. They 
therefore do not offer real employment to those that they engage aside the entrepreneurs‟ themselves. Most of these 
unorganized MSEs do not fully pay for some of the factors of production, wages, rent and tax. It must be noted that 
about sixty percent (60%) of the MSEs involved in this survey were unorganized and this affected the overall 
significance of both changes in numbers of employees and the total turnover on investment for the composite 
analysis.  Labour productivity seems to be lower in organized MSEs than unorganized. This supports the theory of 
negative marginal returns. Here, organized MSEs no matter how small fill out the organizational chart with the 
required labour. As more and more labour is employed the return on investment dwindles. In addition, organized 
MSEs have to pay for all the other factors of production, rent, wages and tax aside the enterprises contrary to this 
case of unorganized MSEs. This stretches and puts the real economic capabilities of the organized MSEs on the line 
resulting in a dwindling effect on their capital holdings. Though other research results suggests that capital 
productivity is higher in SMEs than in LSEs, the results of this study points to the fact that this is still not enough to 
sustain the growth of MSEs and therefore impact significantly on the development of MSEs. This challenges earlier 
observations that capital productivity is higher in small enterprises than larger ones. Available data indicate that 
even though the private sector which is basically dominated by MSEs accounts for more than eighty percent of 
employment, it constitutes only about forty percent of the Gross National Income (GNI). This  supports the evidence 
of mismatch between increase in number of employees created by Susu dependent MSEs and increases in total 
turnover on investment. Thus, all things being equal, for the MSE sector in Ghana to create more employment 
opportunities, which would lead to income stability and a more equitable distribution of income, other conditions 
should prevail. These should include training in basic business management skills, availability and access to capital, 
cost of capital, low inflation and favorable government policies.  
 
Other Latent Strengths Of Susu 
 
Aside being a financial capital, Susu also serves as a strong social capital base which is an incentive to 
most members. The benefits derived from the networks of people working together as in the most prominent Susu 
schemes (the ROSCA and Susu Clubs cannot be compensated for by the formal banking institutions. These are 
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beneficial packages that formal and semi-informal banking and financial systems cannot offer their clients and 
therefore may not be able to compete with the Susu system over such clients. As part of the focus on customers, 
Susu does not only deliver the service at the comfort zone of its clients, it serves as a meeting place for clients to 
socialize weekly or periodically and as and when required.  Susu in real concrete situations has gone beyond a 
financial product to a welfare product where individual members of the group have a sense of belonging and 
support. 
 
The welfare aspect of Susu in effect is an additional product for the contributors and therefore gives these 
operatives a competitive advantage within the target group over the traditional banking institutions. In addition, Susu 
has quite an effective mechanism of “Know Your Customers system” (KYC), which probably cannot be replicated 
by formal systems. This reduces the inherent risks and hazards of clean lending because it does not require any 
collateral. The Susu system for KYC cannot at the moment be easily replicated by the formal banking institutions. 
This is because the formal systems for  KYC in Ghana, is poor due to inadequate infrastructure in terms of  the 
address system, street naming system, house numbering and the national identification system, which  are either  
lacking or  even when available not  reliable. This makes it really difficult for banks to identify and trace clean 
lending customers when the customer‟s location changes. Interviews conducted with bank staff in this study, 
revealed that this weakness has been exploited by some staff in some of the banks that introduced the Susu system 
or clean lending system and it is one of the biggest challenges in trying to integrate Susu into the formal banking 
system. One bank officer remarked “some officers tend to manipulate these limitations for personal gains. It is 
known that the KYC policy or system is poor and weak so it is easy for one to say, I can not trace a customer and 
after a period the bank would have to write it off as bad debt. This coupled with the relatively high incidence of 
customer disappearances have not made micro- finance attractive enough for investors.  Banks as a result now 
prefer to deal with a Susu –Representative, so that that person interfaces between the bank and the numerous 
customers. The Susu operatives have their own traditional ways of knowing their customers and employ all manner 
of traditional mechanisms to insure clean lending (no collateral) which, the bank cannot replicate. Entrusting things 
in the hands of the Susu operators have been satisfactory. This reduces the inherent hazards and risks associated 
with clean lending though relatively marginally’.   
 
WEAKNESSES OF THE SUSU SYSTEM 
 
Most of the Weaknesses are inherent in the self regulatory nature. It is therefore recommended that: 
 
Appropriate laws, rules and regulations be enacted to control   the Modus Operandi of the Susu schemes in 
order to sustain and maximize it potential in Ghana. The collectors must be insured to regulate their operations.  This 
would weed out fraudulent individuals who may want to defraud the vulnerable, such as the illiterates and less 
educated members of the scheme 
 
To mitigate the obstacles of irregular payments by contributors and loan delinquency, Susu agents could be 
involved in appraising customers and recovering loans. The National Medium Term Private Sector Development 
Strategy should adequately cater for the regularization and strengthening of the Susu system in its implementation. It 
is believed that with adequate training in book keeping and basic entrepreneurial skill and regulation, Susu could 
tend the informal financial sector round and   contribute effectively to the development of private sector which is 
believed to be the engine of growth of Ghana's economy 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study though not conclusive in itself, suggests that involvement in Susu generally has a relationship 
with MSEs development in Ghana. The study further suggests that  among other factors, Susu presence contributes 
favourably to  the development of MSEs in Ghana. However, Susu favours the development of unorganized MSEs 
than organized. Generally Susu contributes to fund mobilization and cash injection into MSEs and acts as a form of 
insurance for most of these businesses. Though not conclusive enough, the study again suggests that Susu does not 
favour the development of organized MSEs. Statistically, there seem to be some evidence to suggest that MSEs that 
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succeed with Susu are the unorganized ones. MSEs that do not rely on heavy capital outlay are more likely to 
succeed with Susu than those with heavy capital outlay.  
 
In addition, the study concludes that, Susu is more than a financial product. It is also a social capital. It 
performs other useful roles in ensuring social and income stability, growth and employment particularly to 
entrepreneurs of unorganized micro and small enterprises. However such roles in the development of small to 
medium and organized MSEs, which offer real employment to its members not only the entrepreneurs, seem 
limiting. The study therefore supports the view that the job creating impact of MSEs is statistically defective. The 
study also deduced that in searching for answers to the perennial problem of financing MSEs, Susu could be a 
suitable option if well recognized and regulated. However, this study further implies that the developmental needs 
and well being of MSEs go far beyond micro finance.  
 
The study also concludes that the savings mobilizations and credits methods of Susu cannot be easily 
replicated by the formal system but can be adapted. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In the light of the foregoing conclusions of the study, it may be suggested that: 
 
1. Policy makers consider regulating the sector, by enacting appropriate laws, rules and regulations which 
would control   the Modus Operandi of the Susu schemes and also to sustain them. 
2. Collectors must be insured to regulate their operations.  Here, lessons can be learnt from the Credit Union 
Scheme and GCCUA system. This would weed out fraudulent individuals who may want to defraud the 
vulnerable, such as the illiterates and less educated members of the scheme. 
3. To mitigate the obstacles of irregular payments by contributors and loan delinquency, Susu agents could be 
involved in appraising customers and recovering loans. In this case a short training in accounting, book 
keeping and basic business management principles should become a pre-requisite for accepting MSEs into 
the ROSCA and Susu clubs since this is where the loan delinquency rate seems higher. To improve on the 
capacity of Susu operators for appraisal, training should be offered to them in this regard.  
4. Microfinance interventions in general must be tied with basic management training, quality management 
training and basic accounting skills. Here the basic requirement for an MSE to access micro finance should 
not be collateral or merely a form of guarantee but ability to groom the enterprise. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Study Instrument 
 
1. Name  of  Enterprise 
2. Nature of Business 
a. Organized   b. Unorganized 
3. How long have you been operating?      
 
4. How long since you joined the Susu Scheme?   
 
5. What is / are the sources of your initial capital? 
   
a.         Personal Savings  (Susu) 
b.         Relations 
c.         Bank Loan 
d.         Suppliers Credit 
e.         Profits 
f.         Customer Advances  
g.         A combination of the above 
 
6. what is / are the sources of your working capital 
 
a.         Personal Savings  (Susu) 
b.         Relations 
c.         Bank Loan 
d.         Suppliers Credit 
e.         Profits 
f.         Customer Advances  
g.         A combination of the above 
 
7. What was you capital before joining Susu ? 
 
8. What is your capital now? 
 
9. How many people did you employ before joining the Susu Scheme 
 
10. How many people do now after Susu? 
11. How has Susu been Helpful 
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APPENDIX II 
 
The Analysis of changes in Level of Employment and Total Turnover on Investment  
after Five years of involvement of any Susu Scheme (Organized Group) 
 
 No Of Years In The 
Business 
Employees Before 
SUSU 
Employee 
After Susu 
Annual Turnover 
Before Susu (Av.) 
Annual Turnover 
After Susu 000 (Av.) 
1.  8 6 8 547,500 146,000 
2.  5  2 14,450 300,000 
3.  6 1  273,350 547,500 
4.  5 2 2 216,000 864,000 
5.  10 3 4 182,500 365,000 
6.   3 to 5 8 324,000 432,000 
7.  12 1 3 120,000 225,000 
8.  7 1 to 11 1 to 13 30,000 80,000 
9.  10 4 6 270,000 500,000 
10.  15 2 2 146,000 292,000 
11.  20 2 4 700,000 36,000,000 
12.  2 2 4 109,500 225,500 
13.  7 1 2 203,760 547,500 
14.   1 1 300,000 474,500 
15.  25 3 6 156,000 624,000 
16.  8 2 2 108,000 130,000 
17.   1 2 36,500 219,000 
18.  5 1 1 180,000 400,000 
19.  6 2 2 255,500 780,000 
20.  9 1 to 3 4 180,000 400,000 
21.   3 10 240,000 500,000 
22.  3 6  365,000 547,500 
23.   4 to 5 5 to 6 365,700 277,500 
24.  18 3 3 182,500 547,500 
25.  8 2 4 438,000 730,000 
26.  10 1 5 182,500 480,000 
27.  5 1 3 164,250 912,500 
28.  7 2 5 146,000 474,500 
29.  10 2  18,250 328,500 
30.   2 2 328,500 620,500 
31.  9 3 4 324911 655016 
32.  3 1 3 213442 774523 
33.  11 3 3 155432 964835 
34.  7 3 4 334259 534780 
35.  9 2 6 445, 500 498,000 
36.  11 4 9 342,000 240,000 
37.  8 3 7 705, 000 360, 000 
38.  6 2 8 460,000 200,000 
39.  9 4 16 270,000 620,000 
40.  8 3 7 120,000 240,000 
41.  9 4 7 68,0000 186,000 
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The Analysis of Small Scale Industries Financial Strength, Level of Employment, 
And Number of Years Joining The Susu Group Before and After   (Un-organized group) 
 No Of Years In The 
Business 
Employees Before 
Susu 
Employee 
After Susu 
Annual Turnover 
Before Susu (Av.) 
Annual Turnover 
After Susu 000 (Av.) 
42.  9 3 5 46,500 84,000,000 
43.  7 1 3 14,450 26,000,000 
44.  6 1 1 296,500 3,600,000 
45.  5 2 2 216,000 1,200,000 
46.  10 3 4 182,500 365,000 
47.  9 3 5 104,000 3,280,000 
48.  6 1 4 120,000 225,000 
49.  7 4 11 360,000 6,000,000 
50.  10 4 6 270,000 500,000 
51.  13 2 2 143,000 92,000,000 
52.  15 2 4 700,000 6,000,000 
53.  6 1 4 117,500 2,200,500 
54.  11 1 3 228,760 5,500,000 
55.  6 1 1 30,000 560,500 
56.  12 0 3 156,000 1,600,000 
57.  8 1 5 180,000 5,800,000 
58.  17 1 6 66,500 6,200,000 
59.  5 1 3 30,000 400,000 
60.  6 2 2 255,500 780,000 
61.  9 1 to 3 4 180,000 400,000 
62.   3 10 240,000 500,000 
63.  7 6 6 365,000 5,600,500 
64.  6 4 5 65,700 10,700,500 
65.  14 3 4 182,500 3,000,000 
66.  8 2 5 400,000 2,000,000 
67.  10 1 5 800,000 6,000,000 
68.  5 1 3 160, 000 900,000 
69.  6 2 5 150,000 500,000 
70.  10 2 8 200,000 3,500,000 
71.  8 1 4 300,000 4,800,000 
72.  7 3 4 450,000 6,500,000 
73.  3 1 3 250,000 1,800,000 
74.  11 2 2 90,000 2,000,000 
75.  7 3 4 50,00 500,000 
76.  9 2 6 400, 000 1,200,000 
77.  11 4 9 200,000 2,400,000 
78.  8 3 7 70, 000 360, 000 
79.  6 2 8 600,000 3,000,000 
80.  12 4 7 270,000 620,000 
81.  8 3 5 120,000 240,000 
82.  9 1 1 300,000 1,800,000 
83.  7 3 4 250,000 6,500,000 
84.  3 1 1 120,000 800,000 
85.  11 2 2 90,000 1,800,000 
86.  7 1 3 150,00 2,500,000 
87.  9 2 4 600, 000 3,000,000 
88.  11 0 3 200,000 2,400,000 
89.  8 1 2 70, 000 5,000, 000 
90.  6 2 8 600,000 3,000,000 
91.  11 3 5 270,000 1,600,000 
92.  8 2 4 120,000 2,400,000 
93.  9 1 1 300,000 1,800,000 
94.  6 2 5 500,000 6,000,000 
95.  7 0 3 600,000 7,000,000 
96.  5 2 3 800,000 4,000,000 
97.  12 4 6 400,000 3,000,000 
98.  8 1 3 250,000 6,000,000, 
99.  10 3 6 500,000 8,000,000 
100.  11 2 4 40,000 1,200,000 
101.  6 1 3 100,000 2,600,000 
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Composite analysis for changes in employment 
 
sum 218 
n 97 
mean 2.247 
stdev 2.031168218 
st. error 0.206233212 
test statistic 10.89748184 
critical 2.33 
Reject ho 
 
 
Composite analysis for changes in total Turnover on investment 
 
Reject ho 
 
 
Analysis if Differentials Changes in employment for organized 
 
sum 54 
n 32 
mean 1.688 
stdev 1.654661061 
st. error 0.292503148 
test statistic 5.769168669 
critical 2.33 
Reject ho 
 
 
Analysis if Differentials Changes in employment for organized 
 
sum 44,038,850 
n 36 
mean 1,223,301.389 
stdev 5846297.564 
st. error 974382.9274 
test statistic 1.255462667 
critical 2.33 
accept ho  
 
 
Analysis if Differentials Changes in employment  for Unorganized 
 
sum 164 
n 65 
mean 2.523 
stdev 2.151363611 
st. error 0.266852346 
test statistic 9.454955013 
critical 2.33 
Reject ho  
sum 401,221,440 
n 101 
mean 3,972,489.505 
stdev 12866078.15 
st. error 1280334.178 
test statistic 3.102697385 
critical 2.33 
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Analysis if Differentials Changes in Turnover  for Unorganized 
 
sum 357,182,590 
n 65 
mean 5,495,116.769 
stdev 15275869.45 
st. error 1894728.484 
test statistic 2.900213311 
critical 2.33 
Reject ho  
 
 
 
NOTES 
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NOTES 
